

24 August 1959

SUBJECT: Congressional Query Regarding Issuance of Passports
to U. S. Communists

1. I have been asked to comment upon the following question:

"If American Communists can travel without passports to
Canada or Mexico and there obtain documentation for further
travel, of what use is it to deny them U. S. passports in the
first place?"

The question assumes that to be of advantage to the United States the
denial of passports to Communists must prevent or hinder all U. S.
Communist travel anywhere. Although this result cannot be assured,
it should not be concluded that passport denial is useless. The denial
of a passport will not make impossible the travel of high-ranking agents
of the Communist Party or the Soviets, whether the point of departure
is Mexico, Canada, or the United States. U. S. citizens whose
travel is instigated by the Communist intelligence services or is
considered of importance by those services will not be *checked* restrained by
this or any other legislation. In addition to the modus operandi cited,
these services also have the facility to manufacture false passports.

SECRET

2. We have two examples in the Abel and Mink cases of the use of U. S. passports by Soviet agents. In the Abel case, Hayhanen's passport was issued in the mistaken belief that he was a U. S. citizen -- which belief was based on a birth certificate illegally obtained by Soviet Intelligence. Abel had a U. S. passport which he claims he purchased and subsequently substituted his photograph for that of Andrew Kayotis. In addition, both had a total of four birth certificates which would presumably be used to get additional passports if needed.

3. Mink, when arrested in 1935, had in his possession three passports in addition to his own. These passports had been issued to American citizens who did not use them. The vague explanation as to how they got into Mink's possession leaves much to be desired.

4. The question of denying a passport to American Communists does not turn on whether by such a device we can thereby prevent or restrict all U. S. Communist travel. Nevertheless it is our belief that the denial of U. S. passports to Communists would serve the best interests of the United States. There are a number of practical examples to illustrate this point:

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--Alfred and Martha Stern were in Mexico without valid U. S. passports. As a result, when the Sterns fled to refuge behind the Iron Curtain, they were forced to resort to an illegal and heretofore unknown Russian Intelligence Service channel to obtain Paraguayan passports. This development surfaced the illegal channel to our observation and investigation.

--Maurice Halperin, an American Communist in Mexico, was intimately associated with the Sterns. It became apparent to Halperin that he would probably be forced out of Mexico and that he lacked the ability to leave the country because he was unable to secure a U. S. passport under the restrictions then in effect. When State Department passport restrictions were removed, Halperin applied for and received a U. S. passport. He then used it to flee to Russia, where he is now residing. There is no doubt that the Soviets would have been forced to expose another channel in order to extract Halperin from his predicament if the needed document had not been provided him by the U. S. Government.

5. In the Stern case immobility created by the withholding of valid U. S. documentation forced the Soviets to reveal covert assets. In the Halperin case the United States provided him with the mobility that he so badly needed.

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6. Recent examples of U. S. Communists who probably would not have travelled on false documents are Paul Robeson and his wife, Eslanda. Attending the Accra Conference held in December 1958, Eslanda Robeson was very active in attempting to further Communist aims. By her own statement, made in a secret report to a Party member, she bragged that she was the person principally responsible for the removal of the Nationalist Chinese flag from the Accra Conference assembly hall. This action was responsive to a declaration of the Chinese Communist delegation that they would not enter the hall if the flag remained. In addition, she was very active throughout the Conference in attempting to further the Party line. Thereafter she returned to Moscow with her husband, and, while there, wrote about the Accra Conference in a series of Party line articles which were published in the United States.

7. The wife of Dr. W. E. B. Dubois (who uses the name of Shirley Graham) was also present at the Conference and read her husband's speech, which was anti-U. S. and pro-Soviet. She and her husband subsequently travelled to the Soviet Union and Communist China.

8. The recent travels of Harry Bridges are another example of the facilitation which a U. S. passport provides Communists and

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which they systematically abuse to the disadvantage of our own security authorities.

9. Harry Renton Bridges, President of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (USA), received a U. S. passport late in 1958. Using this passport during January and February of this year, Bridges was able to meet with important Communist leaders in Paris, Le Havre, Rome, Cairo, Prague, Moscow, and Berlin. ~~In addition, Bridges also visited in Great Britain, West Germany, Belgium, France, Greece, and Denmark with labor leaders whose organizations are affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.~~

10. In May, using his U. S. passport, Bridges was able to attend the Pacific and Asian Regional Dockworkers Conference in Tokyo. As the key international figure, he organized and directed this conference, which was attended by Communist delegates from Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Okinawa, the USSR, and the United States.

11. Bridges' travel during 1959 has resulted in the most important series of international contacts made by a Communist labor leader in the Free World in recent years. From what we know of these meetings it appears that Bridges had two major objectives. The first and most

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important was to attempt to arrange for working agreements among dockworkers' unions in various countries for mutual support in strike actions.

12. Equally important is the fact that the passport afforded Bridges the opportunity to exploit the status and courtesies which U. S. citizens enjoy abroad. During the course of his travels Bridges also sought to meet with local representatives of the U. ^{S.} Department of State wherever possible and subsequently to exploit such meetings in order to convey the impression to local labor leaders that the U. S. Government approved of his objectives. While abroad, Bridges also tried to convey and exploit the impression that he was in fact a bona-fide representative of the American trade union movement. His statements to the press while in Rome, Prague, and Moscow all professed that the American worker had been misinformed by the U. S. Government and U. S. newspapers.

13. A vast amount of effort by our Service and the services of friendly governments is required to cover travel such as Bridges'. When it is multiplied by the travel of numerous other American Communists who have been going abroad for the past several months, you can see the amount of added work that is entailed.

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SUMMARY

14. Denying passports to U. S. Communists means that the Department of State is not forced to become an unwilling abettor to the international Communist movement. The fact that the United States cannot ~~always~~ prohibit travel by ~~every~~ ^{every} Communist or suspected RLS agent for purposes contrary to our security interests, does not mean that we should facilitate such travel *for all*. Failure to distinguish in this respect between loyal citizens and persons dedicated to our destruction as a nation would create a precedent for the moral blurring of other issues as well.

15. The fact that the denial of a passport may be countered from the Soviet side by the occasional provision of a substitute document, provides U. S. intelligence at home and abroad with further opportunities to investigate undercover clandestine assets which are aimed at the United States. Decreasing the mobility of such persons through passport restrictions increases the difficulties of their communication and as a consequence opens them to more effective scrutiny and counteraction.

16. Legal travel by members of the Communist Party on passports issued by their own countries makes it practically

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impossible to take action against them abroad unless they violate local laws. If they are forced to use illegal documentation, they are vulnerable to arrest, questioning, and searches instant to the arrest. On a number of occasions, we have learned of travel by illegal documentation and have alerted the internal security services of friendly countries. They have taken action, on the basis of this violation of their laws, which has resulted in considerable hindrances to freedom of Communist movement, has resulted in considerable information as a result of interrogation, and has yielded documents of value. This is particularly true of Party members who have gone to Moscow for training and are returning with documentation, notes, and instructions. ~~Informant recall at the moment any instance of such action having been taken with reference to the American.~~ We have, however, taken such action in a number of Latin American cases. For example, a member of the illegal apparatus living illegally in a Latin American country made a trip to Moscow with false papers. A series of actions based by local authorities on information furnished by us, has not only interfered with his Party activities but has actually prevented him from returning to the country where he was operating illegally.

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14. The Communist Party and the Soviet Satellite intelligence agencies presumably have passports to U. S. and other countries. In the past, Soviet passports have been used by Communist Party members to support their documents. They did not intend to use, by false applications to the names of other persons, and by theft or purchase. These passports, of course, are not used if legal documentation is available. The supply of documents obtained in this manner is limited, and thus can be made available only to intelligence agents and certain Party members. The Party members must not be so well known as to preclude the use of such false documentation and their names must be considered vital.

15. Americans traveling abroad, and particularly those who travel to or Communist countries, are regarded by the people of those lands not as private citizens but as official U. S. representatives. Thus today we are sometimes represented abroad by those who are actively seeking the destruction of our way of life.

16. As the leader of the anti-Communist world, the United States is considered in this matter by its allies and the Free World as having a broader responsibility. A failure by the United States

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The effect of control and procedure concerning the use of
passports by members and supporters of the Communist party
and the number and tone of anti-Communist activity
in the Free World.

10. I would like to urge that in the consideration of any bill
regarding the use of passports careful consideration be
given to the necessity of protecting confidential sources.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

26 August 1959

TO: Honorable John W. Hanes
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1A9a
Legislative Counsel, CIA
Telephone Executive 3-6115, X-734

General Cabell indicated that you had called him asking for a copy of his statement before House Foreign Affairs yesterday. Previously John Sipes had asked for the same thing. I have attached it for your use and would appreciate return when it has served your purpose. While it may not be particularly sensitive, some of the sources are. In the meantime, I have been in touch with Boyd Crawford suggesting that if any absent members wish to have this available arrangements could be made.


FORM 10-58 1533

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADMINISTRATOR
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs

August 27, 1959


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Legislative Counsel, CIA
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.



Thanks very much for the loan
of the attached statement.

John W. Hanes, Jr.

	<p>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 2430 E STREET, N. W. WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 2 September 1959</p>
TO:	<p>Mr. John W. Sipes Room 4167 - New State Building Washington 25, D. C.</p>
FROM:	<p>Legislative Counsel, CIA Telephone Executive 3-6115, X-734</p>
<p>In accordance with our previous conversations, the attached material was delivered to Representative Selden's office on 1 September with the stipulation that the information would not be attributed to CIA but that otherwise Mr. Selden was free to use it as he saw fit. I believe this satisfies Selden's request to us through you.</p>	

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 20 January 1960	
TO: Mr. [REDACTED]			
ROOM NO. 1020	BUILDING J Building		
REMARKS:			
<p>Returned herewith are the briefing notes and your Memorandum for the Director relating to the passport question.</p> <p>We will abstract the pertinent portions of the transcript of the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and forward them for your information later during the week.</p> <p><i>Handwritten:</i> No copy of Memo of 1-17-60 is being returned. [REDACTED]</p> <p><i>Handwritten:</i> (This item not included in NIT-1 package)</p>			
FROM: [REDACTED] Assistant General Counsel			
ROOM NO. 226	BUILDING East		EXTENSION 488
FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241			
REPLACES FORM 36-B WHICH MAY BE USED.			